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Abstract
Though deep neural networks have achieved the state of the
art performance in visual classification, recent studies have
shown that they are all vulnerable to the attack of adver-
sarial examples. In this paper, we develop improved tech-
niques for defending against adversarial examples.First, we
introduce enhanced defense using a technique we call Atten-
tion and Adversarial Logit Pairing(AT+ALP), a method
that encourages both attention map and logit for pairs of ex-
amples to be similar. When applied to clean examples and
their adversarial counterparts, AT+ALP improves accuracy
on adversarial examples over adversarial training.Next,We
show that our AT+ALP can effectively increase the aver-
age activations of adversarial examples in the key area and
demonstrate that it focuse on more discriminate features to
improve the robustness of the model.Finally,we conducte
extensive experiments using a wide range of datasets and
the experiment results show that our AT+ALP achieves the
state of the art defense.For example,on 17 Flower Cate-
gory Database, under strong 200-iteration PGD gray-box
and black-box attacks where prior art has 34% and 39% ac-
curacy, our method achieves 50% and 51%.Compared with
previous work,our work is evaluated under highly challeng-
ing PGD attack:the maximum perturbation  ∈ {0.25, 0.5}
i.e. L∞ ∈ {0.25, 0.5} with 10 to 200 attack iterations.To our
knowledge, such a strong attack has not been previously ex-
plored on a wide range of datasets.
Introduction
In recent years, deep neural networks have been extensively
deployed for computer vision tasks, particularly visual
classification problems, where new algorithms reported to
achieve or even surpass the human performance(Krizhevsky,
Sutskever, and Hinton 2012; He et al. 2015; Li et al.
2019a).Success of deep neural networks has led to an ex-
plosion in demand. recent studies have shown that they
are all vulnerable to the attack of adversarial examples.
Small and often imperceptible perturbations to the input im-
ages are sufficient to fool the most powerful deep neural
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 1: (a) is original image and (b) is corresponding spa-
tial attention map of ResNet-50(He et al. 2015) pretrained
on ImageNet(Russakovsky et al. 2015) which shows where
the network focuses in order to classify the given image.(c)
is adversarial image of (a) , (d) is corresponding spatial at-
tention map.
networks(Szegedy et al. 2013; Carlini and Wagner 2016;
Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2016; Bose and
Aarabi 2018).
In Figure 1, we visualize the spatial attention map of a
flower and its corresponding adversarial image on ResNet-
50(He et al. 2015) pretrained on ImageNet(Russakovsky et
al. 2015). The figure suggests that adversarial perturbations,
while small in the pixel space, lead to very substantial noise
in the attention map of the network. Whereas the features
for the clean image appear to focus primarily on semanti-
cally informative content in the image, the attention map
for the adversarial image are activated across semantically
irrelevant regions as well. The state of the art adversarial
training methods only encourage soft(Madry et al. 2017;
Trame`r et al. 2017) or hard labels,i.e.,logit(Kannan, Ku-
rakin, and Goodfellow 2018) for pairs of clean examples
and adversarial counterparts to be similar. In our opinion,
it is not enough to align the difference between the clean
examples and adversarial counterparts only at the end part
of the whole network,i.e., hard or soft labels, and we need
to align the attention maps for important parts of the whole
network. Motivated by this observation,we explore Atten-
tion and Adversarial Logit Pairing(AT+ALP), a method
that encourages both attention map and logit for pairs of ex-
amples to be similar. When applied to clean examples and
their adversarial counterparts,AT+ALP improves accuracy
on adversarial examples over adversarial training.
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The contributions of this paper are the following:
• We introduce enhanced adversarial training using a tech-
nique we call Attention and Adversarial Logit Pair-
ing(AT+ALP), a method that encourages both attention
map and logit for pairs of examples to be similar. When
applied to clean examples and their adversarial counter-
parts, AT+ALP improves accuracy on adversarial exam-
ples over adversarial training.
• We show that our AT+ALP can effectively increase the
average activations of adversarial examples in the key area
and demonstrate that it focuse on more discriminate fea-
tures to improve the robustness of the model.
• We show that our AT+ALP achieves the state of the art
defense on a wide range of datasets against strong PGD
gray-box and black-box attacks.Compared with previ-
ous work,our work is evaluated under highly challenging
PGD attack:the maximum perturbation  ∈ {0.25, 0.5}
i.e. L∞ ∈ {0.25, 0.5} with 10 to 200 attack iterations.To
our knowledge, such a strong attack has not been previ-
ously explored on a wide range of datasets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section
2 related works are summarized, in Section 3 definitions
and threat models are introduced,in Section 4 our Attention
and Adversarial Logit Pairing(AT+ALP) method is intro-
duced, in Section 5 experimental results are presented and
discussed, and finally in Section 6 the paper is concluded.
Related Work
(Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018) evaluate the robust-
ness of nine papers(Buckman et al. 2018; Ma et al. 2018;
Guo et al. 2017; Dhillon et al. 2018; Xie et al. 2017;
Song et al. 2017; Samangouei, Kabkab, and Chellappa 2018;
Madry et al. 2017; Na, Ko, and Mukhopadhyay 2017) ac-
cepted to ICLR 2018 as non-certified white-box-secure de-
fenses to adversarial examples. They find that seven of the
nine defenses use obfuscated gradients, a kind of gradient
masking, as a phenomenon that leads to a false sense of se-
curity in defenses against adversarial examples.Obfuscated
gradients provide a limited increase in robustness and can
be broken by improved attack techniques they develop.The
only defense they observe that significantly increases robust-
ness to adversarial examples within the threat model pro-
posed is adversarial training(Madry et al. 2017).
Adversarial training(Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy
2014; Madry et al. 2017; Kannan, Kurakin, and Goodfellow
2018; Trame`r et al. 2017; Pang et al. 2019) defends against
adversarial perturbations by training networks on adversar-
ial images that are generated on-the-fly during training. For
adversarial training, the most relevant work to our study is
(Kannan, Kurakin, and Goodfellow 2018) ,which introduce
a technique they call Adversarial Logit Pairing(ALP), a
method that encourages logits for pairs of examples to be
similar. Our AT+ALP encourages both attention map and
logit for pairs of examples to be similar. When applied to
clean examples and their adversarial counterparts, AT+ALP
improves accuracy on adversarial examples over adversarial
training.(Araujo et al. 2019) adds random noise at training
and inference time,(Xie et al. 2018) adds denoising blocks
to the model to increase adversarial robustness,neither of the
above approaches focuses on the attention map.
In terms of methodologies, our work is also related
to deep transfer learning and knowledge distillation prob-
lems,the most relevant work to our study is (Zagoruyko and
Komodakis 2016a; Li et al. 2019b),which constrain the L2-
norm of the difference between their behaviors (i.e., the fea-
ture maps of outer layer outputs in the source/target net-
works).Our AT+ALP constrains attention map and logit for
pairs of clean examples and their adversarial counterparts to
be similar.
Definitions and Threat Models
In this paper, we always assume the attacker is capable of
forming attacks that consist of perturbations of limited L∞-
norm. This is a simplified task chosen because it is more
amenable to benchmark evaluations. We consider two dif-
ferent threat models characterizing amounts of information
the adversary can have:
• Gray-box Attack We focus on defense against gray-
box attacks in this paper. In a gray-back attack, the at-
tacker knows both the original network and the defense
algorithm. Only the parameters of the defense model
are hidden from the attacker.This is also a standard set-
ting assumed in many security systems and applica-
tions(Pfleeger and Pfleeger 2004).
• Black-box Attack The attacker has no information about
the models architecture or parameters, and no ability to
send queries to the model to gather more information.
Methods
Architecture
Figure 2 represents architecture of Attention and Adver-
sarial Logit Pairing(AT+ALP): a baseline model is adver-
sarial trained so as, not only to make similar logits, but to
also have similar spatial attention maps to those of original
image and adversarial image.
Adversarial training
We use adversarial training with Projected Gradient De-
scent(PGD)(Madry et al. 2017) as the underlying basis for
our methods:
argmin
θ
E(x,y)∈pˆ data
(
max
δ∈S
L(θ, x+ δ, y)
)
(1)
where pˆ data is the underlying training data distribution,
L(θ, x + δ, y) is a loss function at data point x which has
true class y for a model with parameters θ, and the maxi-
mization with respect to δ is approximated using PGD. In
this paper,the loss is defined as:
L = LCE + αLALP + βLAT (2)
Where LCE is cross entropy,α and β are hyperparame-
ters.
Figure 2: Schematic representation of Attention and Adversarial Logit Pairing(AT+ALP): a baseline model is trained so as,
not only to make similar logits, but to also have similar spatial attention maps to those of original image and adversarial image.
Adversarial Logit Pairing
We also use Adversarial Logit Pairing(ALP) to encourage
the logits from clean examples and their adversarial coun-
terparts to be similar to each other. For a model that takes
inputs x and computes a vector of logit z = f(x), logit pair-
ing adds a loss:
LALP = La(f(x), f(x+ δ)) (3)
In this paper we use L2 loss for La.
Attention Map
We use Attention Map(AT) to encourage the attention map
from clean examples and their adversarial counterparts to
be similar to each other.Let also I denote the indices of all
activation layer pairs for which we want to pay attention.
Then we can define the following total loss:
LAT =
∑
j∈I
∥∥∥∥∥∥ Q
j
ADV∥∥∥QjADV ∥∥∥
2
− Q
j
O∥∥∥QjO∥∥∥
2
∥∥∥∥∥∥
p
(4)
Let O, ADV denote clean examples and their adversarial
counterparts.where QjO = vec
(
F
(
AjO
))
and QjADV =
vec
(
F
(
AjADV
))
are respectively the j-th pair of clean ex-
amples and their adversarial counterparts attention maps in
vectorized form, and p refers to norm type (in the experi-
ments we use p = 2).
Experiments:Gray and Black-Box Settings
To evaluate the effectiveness of our defense strategy,
we performed a series of image-classification experiments
on 17 Flower Category Database(Nilsback and Zisser-
man 2006),Part of ImageNet Database and Dogs-vs-Cats
Database. Following (Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018;
Xie et al. 2018; Dubey et al. 2019), we assume an adversary
that uses the state of the art PGD adversarial attack method.
We consider untargeted attacks when evaluating under
the gray and black-box settings ; untargeted attacks are
also used in our adversarial training. We evaluate top-1
classification accuracy on validation images that are adver-
sarially perturbed by the attacker. In this paper, adversar-
ial perturbation is considered under L∞ norm (i.e., max-
imum perturbation for each pixel), with an allowed max-
imum value of . The value of  is relative to the pixel
intensity scale of 256,we use  = 64/256 = 0.25 and
 = 128/256 = 0.5. PGD attacker with 10 to 200 attack
iterations and step size α = 1.0/256 = 0.0039. Our base-
lines are ResNet-101/152. There are four groups of convo-
lutional structures in the baseline model,group-0 extracts of
low-level features,group-1 and group-2 extract of mid-level
features,group-3 extracts of high-level features(Zagoruyko
and Komodakis 2016b),which are described as conv2 x,
conv3 x,conv4 x and conv5 x in (He et al. 2015)
Image Database
We performed a series of image-classification experiments
on a wide range of datasets.
• 17 Flower Category Database(Nilsback and Zisserman
2006) contains images of flowers belonging to 17 differ-
ent categories.The images were acquired by searching the
web and taking pictures. There are 80 images for each
category.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3: Defense against gray-box and black-box attacks on 17 Flower Category Database.(a)(c) shows results against a
gray-box PGD attacker with 10 to 200 attack iterations.(b)(d) shows results against a black-box PGD attacker with 10 to 200
attack iterations.The maximum perturbation is  ∈ {0.25, 0.5} i.e. L∞ ∈ {0.25, 0.5}.Our AT+ALP(purple line) outperform
the state-of-the-art in adversarial robustness against highly challenging gray-box and black-box PGD attacks.
• Part of ImageNet Database contains images of four ob-
jects. These four objects are randomly selected from the
ImageNet Database(Russakovsky et al. 2015). In this ex-
periment, they are tench,goldfish,white shark and dog.
Each object contains 1300 training images and 50 test im-
ages.
• Dogs-vs-Cats Database1 contains 8,000 images of dogs
and cats in the train dataset and 2,000 in the test val
dataset.
Experimental Setup
To perform image classification, we use ResNet-
101/152 that were trained on the 17 Flower Category
Database,Part of ImageNet Database and Dogs-vs-Cats
Database training set. We consider two different attack
settings: (1) a gray-box attack setting in which the model
used to generate the adversarial images is the same as
1https://www.kaggle.com/chetankv/dogs-cats-images
the image- classification model, viz. the ResNet-101; and
(2) a black-box attack setting in which the adversarial
images are generated using the ResNet-152 model;The
backend prediction model of gray-box and black-box is
ResNet-101 with different implementations of the state
of the art defense methods,such as IGR(Ross and Doshi-
Velez 2017),PAT(Madry et al. 2017),RAT(Araujo et al.
2019),Randomization(Xie et al. 2017) , ALP(Kannan,
Kurakin, and Goodfellow 2018) and FD(Xie et al. 2018) .
Results and Discussion
Here, we first present results with AT+ALP on 17 Flower
Category Database. Compared with previous work,(Kan-
nan, Kurakin, and Goodfellow 2018) was evaluated under
10-iteration PGD attack and  = 0.0625,our work are eval-
uated under highly challenging PGD attack:the maximum
perturbation  ∈ {0.25, 0.5} i.e. L∞ ∈ {0.25, 0.5} with 10
to 200 attack iterations.The bigger the value of , the bigger
the disturbance, the more significant the adversarial image
Table 1: Defense against gray-box and black-box attacks on 17 Flower Category Database ,Part of ImageNet Database
and Dogs-vs-Cats Database.The adversarial perturbation were produced using PGD with step size α = 1.0/256 = 0.0039
and 200 attack iterations.As shown in this table, AT+ALP got the highest Top-1 Accuracy on all these database.
17 Flower Category Database Gray-Box Black-Box
 = L∞ 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.5
No Defence 0 0 15 10
IGR(Ross and Doshi-Velez 2017) 10 3 17 10
PAT(Madry et al. 2017) 55 34 57 39
RAT(Araujo et al. 2019) 54 30 57 32
Randomization(Xie et al. 2017) 12 6 27 16
ALP(Kannan, Kurakin, and Goodfellow 2018) 47 23 49 25
FD(Xie et al. 2018) 10 10 33 33
Our AT 41 24 45 29
Our AT+ALP 68 50 70 51
Part of ImageNet Database Gray-Box Black-Box
 = L∞ 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.5
No Defence 2 3 52 50
IGR(Ross and Doshi-Velez 2017) 32 32 34 34
PAT(Madry et al. 2017) 76 76 77 77
RAT(Araujo et al. 2019) 76 76 77 76
Randomization(Xie et al. 2017) 40 41 62 59
ALP(Kannan, Kurakin, and Goodfellow 2018) 54 54 55 55
FD(Xie et al. 2018) 60 61 61 61
Our AT 76 76 77 76
Our AT+ALP 82 82 82 82
Dogs-vs-Cats Database Gray-Box Black-Box
 = L∞ 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.5
No Defence 1 1 52 53
IGR(Ross and Doshi-Velez 2017) 57 60 51 52
PAT(Madry et al. 2017) 51 51 52 52
RAT(Araujo et al. 2019) 49 49 50 50
Randomization(Xie et al. 2017) 10 8 55 54
ALP(Kannan, Kurakin, and Goodfellow 2018) 57 56 57 57
FD(Xie et al. 2018) 57 57 57 57
Our AT 50 50 50 50
Our AT+ALP 67 67 71 71
(a) original (b) adversarial
(c) Baseline model,labeled as ”Buttercup” (d) Baseline model,labeled as ”Windflower”
(e) ALP,labeled as ”Bluebell” (f) AT,labeled as ”LilyValley”
(g) AT+ALP,labeled as ”Buttercup”
Figure 4: Activation attention maps for defense against gray-box PGD attacks( = 0.25) on 17 Flower Category
Database.(a) is original image and (b) is corresponding adversarial image.(c) and (d) are activation attention maps of baseline
model for original image and adversarial image, (e)-(f) are activation attention maps of ALP,AT and AT+ALP for adversarial
image.Group-0 to group-3 represent the activation attention maps of four groups of convolutional structures in the baseline
model,group-0 extracts of low-level features,group-1 and group-2 extract of mid-level features,group-3 extracts of high-level
features(Zagoruyko and Komodakis 2016b). It can be clearly found that group-0 of AT + ALP can extract the outline and
texture of flowers more accurately, and group-3 has a higher level of activation on the whole flower,compared with other
defense methods, only it makes accurate prediction.
effect is.To our knowledge, such a strong attack has not been
previously explored on a wide range of datasets.As shown
in Figure 3 that our AT+ALP outperform the state-of-the-
art in adversarial robustness against highly challenging
gray-box and black-box PGD attacks. For example, un-
der strong 200-iteration PGD gray-box and black-box at-
tacks where prior art has 34% and 39% accuracy, our method
achieves 50% and 51%.
Table 1 shows Main Result of our work:under strong
200-iteration PGD gray-box and black-box attacks,our
AT+ALP outperform the state-of-the-art in adversarial
robustness on all these databases.
We visualized activation attention maps for defense
against PGD attacks.Baseline model is ResNet-101(He et
al. 2015),which is pre-trained on ImageNet(Russakovsky
et al. 2015) and fine-tuned on 17 Flower Category
Database(Nilsback and Zisserman 2006),group-0 to group-
3 represent the activation attention maps of four groups of
convolutional structures in the baseline model i.e. conv2 x,
conv3 x,conv4 x and conv5 x of ResNet-101 ,group-0 ex-
tracts of low-level features,group-1 and group-2 extract
of mid-level features,group-3 extracts of high-level fea-
tures(Zagoruyko and Komodakis 2016b).We found from
Figure 4 that group-0 of AT + ALP can extract the outline
and texture of flowers more accurately, and group-3 has a
higher level of activation on the whole flower,compared with
other defense methods, only AT + ALP makes accurate pre-
diction.
Table 2: Comparing average activations on discriminate parts of 17 Flower Category Database for different defense meth-
ods.In addition, we included new statistical results of activations on part locations of 17 Flower Category Database supporting
the above qualitative cases. The 17 Flower Category Database defined discriminative parts of flowers. So for each image, we
got several key regions which are very important to discriminate its category. Using all testing examples of 17 Flower Category
Database, we calculated normalized activations on these key regions of these different defense methods. As shown in this table,
AT+ALP got the highest average activations on those key regions, demonstrating that AT+ALP focused on more discriminate
features for flowers recognition.
Defense Black-Box Gray-Box
 = L∞ 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.5
No Defense 0.41 0.41 0.21 0.21
ALP(Kannan, Kurakin, and Goodfellow 2018) 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15
IGR(Ross and Doshi-Velez 2017) 0.37 0.37 0.33 0.33
PAT(Madry et al. 2017) 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.44
RAT(Araujo et al. 2019) 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.41
Our AT 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.56
Our AT+ALP 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.96
We compared average activations on discriminate parts of
17 Flower Category Database for different defense meth-
ods.17 Flower Category Database defined discriminative
parts of flowers. So for each image, we got several key
regions which are very important to discriminate its cat-
egory.Using all testing examples of 17 Flower Category
Database, we calculated normalized activations on these
key regions of these different defense methods. As shown
in Table 2, AT+ALP got the highest average activations on
those key regions, demonstrating that AT+ALP focused on
more discriminate features for flowers recognition.
(a) (b)
Figure 5: (a) is original image and (b) is corresponding
discriminative parts.17 Flower Category Database defined
discriminative parts of flowers. So for each image, we got
several key regions which are very important to discriminate
its category.
Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced enhanced defense using a tech-
nique we called Attention and Adversarial Logit Pair-
ing(AT+ALP), a method that encouraged both attention
map and logit for pairs of examples to be similar. When
applied to clean examples and their adversarial counter-
parts, AT+ALP improved accuracy on adversarial examples
over adversarial training.Our AT+ALP achieves the state of
the art defense on a wide range of datasets against PGD
gray-box and black-box attacks.Compared with other de-
fense methods, our AT+ALP is simple and effective, with-
out modifying the model structure, and without adding ad-
ditional image preprocessing steps.
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